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Paying the Price of Process:
Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements
Stephen J. Ware'
Arbitration clauses now appear in many of the form contracts through which
consumers obtain goods, services and credit.' Why do so many businesses that deal
with consumers choose arbitration? Relative to litigation, arbitration provides
opportunities for a business to save on its dispute-resolution costs. If arbitration
does, in fact, lower these costs then arbitration lowers the prices (and interest rates)
consumers pay because competition forces businesses to pass their cost-savings on
to consumers.
This pro-consumer aspect of arbitration is generally overlooked,3 and the
enforceability of consumer arbitration agreements is often criticized.' Not all
consumer arbitration agreements are enforced.' Courts regulate consumer arbitration
by enforcing arbitration clauses that have certain features, while refusing to enforce
arbitration clauses that lack those features. 6 This judicial regulation of arbitration
* Professor of Law, Samford University, Cumberland School of Law. Thanks to Chris Drahozal and
Ed Anderson.
1. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1001 n.3 (1996). Other form contracts frequently containing
arbitration clauses include employment contracts, franchise agreements, and investor-brokerage
agreements: While this article is worded in terms of consumer contracts, the reasoning generally applies
to other form contracts as well. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other
Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2001).
2. See infra Part l.B.
3. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(acknowledging possibility that arbitration lowers prices); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration
and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers' Informed Consent to Arbitration
Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 275, 298-99 (1999) ("The benefits of
arbitration which accrue to consumers, [include] savings on legal fees by the company (some of which
will inevitably be passed on to consumers in the form of lower costs)...."); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer
Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 211-13 & n.95 (1998).
4. See F. Paul Bland, Jr., To Fight Arbitration Abuse, The Devil is in the Details, TRIAL, July, 2000,
at 31; Paul D. Carrington, The Dark Side of Contract Law: Courts A re Increasingly Validating Standard
Form Contracts That Eviscerate People's Rights: Trial Lawyers Must Fight the Trend, TRIAL, May
2000, at 73; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 33 1;
R. Larson Frisby, Congress Considers Curbing Mandatory Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2000, at 32; Thomas J. Methvin, Alabama The Arbitration State, 62 ALA. LAw. 48 (2001); Jean
Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642-43 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); David G.
Wirtes, Jr., Suggestions for Defeating Arbitration, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 111 (2000).
5. See cases cited infra notes 36 & 40. See also Drahozal quote infra note 56. See generally STEPHEN
J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.25 & 2.28 (2001).
6. Those features are identified and discussed infra Part I1.
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agreements increases the dispute-resolution costs of the businesses with which
consumers deal. And this cost-increase, in turn, raises the prices consumers pay. In
short, judicial regulation of consumer arbitration agreements imposes costs on
consumers. Whether such regulation yields any benefits that outweigh these costs
is a complex and controversial question.'
I. ARBITRATION CLAUSES LOWER PRICES
A. Assumption: Arbitration Clauses Lower Business' Costs
Arbitration, like litigation, is a form of binding adjudication.8 The process of
arbitration, however, can be very different from the process of litigation. These
differences can make arbitration attractive to businesses that deal with consumers.
Relative to litigation, arbitration provides opportunities for such a business to save
on its dispute-resolution costs.
First, arbitration does away with juries and, for that reason, is commonly
thought to reduce the likelihood of high damages awards against businesses. 9
Second, arbitration's confidentiality "lessens the risk of adverse publicity" about a
business and its disputes.'0 Third, arbitration can resolve disputes "according to a
nationally uniform set of procedures,"" thus saving interstate businesses the costs
of adapting to different procedural rules in different states. Fourth, arbitration's
finality (near absence of appellate review) saves businesses the costs of appeals. 2
Fifth, arbitration can eliminate the possibility of class actions against businesses.' 3
Sixth, arbitration can deter claims against businesses by requiring consumer-
plaintiffs to pay arbitrator fees, as well as filing fees that exceed the filing fees in
litigation. 4 Seventh, arbitration can reduce the amount of discovery available to
consumer-plaintiffs, thus reducing the amount of time and money businesses must
spend on the discovery process and also making it harder for consumers to prove
their claims.'"
7. See infra Part Ill.
8. See WARE supra note 5, § 1.6(c).
9. See Nancy J. Warren & Michael D. Young, Arbitration Sees Victories in U.S. Supreme Court,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 2001, at BI4.
For those who represent large companies, arbitration is also seen as an opportunity to avoid
the unpredictability of juries. Arbitrators are generally viewed as more likely to render
awards that bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages incurred, although large
awards for noneconomic injury, as well as punitive damage awards, are not unheard of in
arbitration.
Id. See also ALAN S. KAPLINSKY & MARK J. LEVIN, Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer
Financial Services Companies, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 845-48
(1999) (arbitration "eliminates irrational jury verdicts").
10. KAPLINSKY & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 845.
It. Id.
12. Id. See WARE, supra note 5, § 2.43 (courts rarely vacate arbitration awards).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part lI.B.
15. See infra Part II.C.
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The foregoing is a list ofjust some of the reasons why arbitration might enable
a business to save on its dispute-resolution costs. And these reasons have apparently
led a number of businesses to include arbitration clauses in their consumer
contracts. 6 There is not, however, any publicly-available study indicating whether
arbitration clauses have in fact saved businesses money. A business using consumer
arbitration agreements could study the effects of those agreements on the business'
bottom line, 7 and it seems likely that some such businesses have done so.
Nevertheless, research revealed no publicly-available studies of that sort. So this
article will proceed on an assumption. The assumption, customary in economics, is
that businesses generally act in their own interests, i.e., are "profit-maximizing.""
This article will assume that those businesses that use consumer arbitration
agreements are doing so because those businesses find that they benefit from those
agreements, i.e., that those agreements lower their dispute-resolution costs.' 9
B. Competition Forces Businesses to Pass on
Cost-Savings to Consumers
Assuming that consumer arbitration agreements lower the dispute-resolution
costs of businesses that use them, competition will (over time) force these businesses
to pass their cost-savings to consumers.2 ° This pass-on follows from a basic
principle of economics, the rate-of-return equalization principle. As a standard
economics text explains:
If the market price of a good is greater than the opportunity cost of
producing it, suppliers will gain from an expansion in production. Profit-
seeking entrepreneurs will be attracted to the industry. Investment capital
will flow into the industry, and output (supply) will expand until the
additional supply lowers the market price sufficiently to eliminate the
profits. In contrast, if the market price is less than the good's opportunity
cost of production, suppliers will lose money if they continue to produce
the good. The losses will drive producers from the market and capital
will flow away from the industry. Eventually the decline in supply and
shrinkage in the capital base (durable productive assets) of the industry
will push prices upward and eliminate the losses.
In a market economy, characterized by freedom of entry and exit,
there will be a tendency for the after-tax rate of return on investment to
16. See KAPLINSKY & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 845-48.
17. On the methodological issues surrounding such a study, see Ware, Effects of Gilmer, supra note
1.
18. See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
532-39, 563-65 & 595-98 (7th ed. 1995) (profit-maximizing firms produce additional output so long as
the marginal revenue of doing so exceeds the marginal cost).
19. It is possible that businesses using arbitration agreements are acting against their own interests
by doing so. Similarly, it is possible that businesses that choose not to use arbitration agreements are
acting against their own interests. Given the variety of businesses and their situations, it seems likely
that consumer arbitration agreements are in the interests of some businesses, but not others.
20. The pass-on can be in the form of lower prices or some other change favoring consumers, such
as a more generous warranty.
2001]
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move toward a uniform rate, the competitive or normal-profit return.
Neither abnormally high nor abnormally low after-tax returns will persist
for long periods of time. This tendency for returns on investment capital
to move toward a uniform, normal rate is sometimes referred to as the
rate-of-return equalization principle.2'
The rate-of-return equalization principle implies that whatever increases an
industry's profits ultimately attracts additional capital to that industry, causing an
increase in that industry's output and therefore a reduction in its price. Suppose, for
example, that firms in the widget industry add arbitration clauses to their consumer
contracts and that this causes a reduction in these firms' dispute-resolution costs and
a corresponding increase in their profits. These above-normal profits will attract
additional capital to the widget industry, causing an increase in the supply of widgets
and therefore a reduction in the price of widgets.
Importantly, this process occurs regardless of whether consumers understand,
or even notice, the arbitration clauses.22 This process works to lower prices because
investors and entrepreneurs are alert to above-normal profits, not because consumers
are alert to the arbitration clauses which cause those profits. 23 The increase in output
attracted by above-normal profits is what lowers prices. In other words, the fact that
widget-buying consumers get arbitration clauses is what causes them to also get
lower prices. This is an example of the general insight that contract terms favorable
to sellers go hand-in-hand with lower prices. Recognition of this has been standard
in the law-and-economics literature for at least a quarter of a century.24
The law-and-economics literature features debate about the existence of, and
proper response to, the problem of imperfect information causing unregulated form
contract terms to be too harsh to the consumer with respect to terms about which
consumers are often ignorant and (therefore) too favorable to the consumer with
respect to those terms, such as price, about which consumers are typically
knowledgeable.25 Some articles opposing enforcement of consumer arbitration
21. GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 18, at 67-68 (emphasis in original).
22. Ware, supra note 3, at 212 n.95.
23. For this reason, one must be careful about assertions that "the competitive defense of form
contracts depends on an assumption that consumers read, understand, and evaluate the cost of the
binding arbitration clause being imposed by the seller." Stemlight, supra note 4, at 688. If the
"competitive defense" refers to the contention that "benefits secured by [sellers] through imposition of
an arbitration provision will be passed on to the consumers," Id. at 687, then the competitive defense,
as explained in the text, does not depend on an assumption that consumers read or understand the
arbitration clause.
24. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-In visible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461,
485-87 (1974) "[H]arsh terms will, . . . in equilibrium, yield lower prices." Id. at 487.
25. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996); Lee Goldman, My Way
and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economnic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Marketsfor Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1402-20 (1983); M.J.
Trebilcock & D.N. Dewees,Judicial Control ofStandard Form Contracts, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO LAW 93-119 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds. 1981); M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of
[Vol. 200 1, No. I
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agreements cite this law-and-economics debate.26 These articles can be read as
asserting that imperfect information causes consumer arbitration agreements to be
too harsh to the consumer with respect to the arbitration clause and too favorable to
the consumer with respect to price. 27  These articles, however, lack an explicit
acknowledgment that harsh terms yield lower prices.28 So these articles may reflect
a belief that price-reductions occur only when consumers "read, understand, and
evaluate" the arbitration clause.2 9 To reiterate, that belief clashes with the reasoning
of this article's previous few paragraphs.3 °
Those paragraphs began with the plausible assumption that enforceable
consumer arbitration agreements lower the dispute-resolution costs of businesses that
choose to use such agreements. These cost-savings lead, through competition among
businesses for capital, to lower prices for consumers. The greater the cost-savings
to business, the greater the price reduction for consumers. To put it another way, the
more costly arbitration is to business, the more consumers pay for goods, services
and credit. When arbitration law changes in a way that makes arbitration more
costly to business, then arbitration law is raising prices paid by consumers. Attempts
to make arbitration more favorable (or "fair") to consumers have a downside for
consumers if the effect of those attempts is to raise businesses' arbitration costs.
The following section discusses recent judicial decisions likely to make
arbitration more costly to business. To the extent these cases have that effect, they
can be known as "price-raising cases" or simply "price-raisers."
II. PRICE-RAISING CASES
A. Requiring Class Actions
First among the price-raisers are cases holding that arbitration agreements must
allow for class actions. Businesses can incur substantial liability in consumer class
actions, both in cases that provide significant relief to the class and in cases that
provide insignificant relief to the class but significant fees to plaintiffs' lawyers."
Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO
L. J. 359, 375-76 (1976).
26. Carrington, supra note 4, at 74-76; Stemlight, supra note 4, at 688.
27. See Ware, supra note 3, at 212 n.95 (reading Stemlight's article that way).
28. Carrington, supra note 4, at 74-76; Stemlight, supra note 4, at 688.
29. Stemlight, supra note 4, at 688. See also Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between
Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 267, 332 (1995) (describing "consumer advocates' " view that it is "unlikely the cost
savings realized by arbitration would be passed on to consumers"); Carrington, supra note 4, at 74-76
(the market does not work to "assure[] fair value" because of the "profound disparity of information
between parties when a dispute resolution clause is inserted into a standard form contract .. "); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of
Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1397 (1999) ("no evidence to suggest any reduction in price flows
from enforced arbitration").
30. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
31. Drahozal, supra note 3 ("class actions tend to be run by, and for the benefit of, the plaintiffs'
attorneys"). See generally Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart "and "Blackmail" Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class
2001]
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Limiting consumer claims to individual actions would deter some of those claims
that plaintiffs' lawyers find worth pursuing as part of a class action, but not as an
individual action.32 Accordingly, some businesses use arbitration clauses in the hope
that courts will enforce these clauses to preclude class actions.33 And many cases
have done just that. 4 Other cases, by contrast, have certified classwide arbitration,35
or allowed classwide litigation to proceed notwithstanding the arbitration clause.36
These cases, by requiring that arbitration preserve the class action, raise the cost of
arbitration to businesses and, therefore, raise prices to consumers.
Actions, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
32. A few of these claims would not be deterred beT. use the consumer would pursue the claim pro
se, i.e., without a lawyer.
33. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
34. Cases enforcing arbitration agreements to preclude classwide relief include Johnson v. West
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., 2000 WL 45493
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2000); Brown v. Surety Finance Service, Inc., 2000 WL 528631 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 24,
2000); Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2ff627 (D. Del. 1999); Zawikowski v. Beneficial
NationalBank, 1999 WL 35304 (N.D. 111. Jan. 11, 1999); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerderler,
977 F. Supp. 654,665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77,
80-81 (D. Conn. 1996); Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co., 1996 WL 210073 (N.D. II1. Apr. 25, 1996);
McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19,1994); Meyers v. Univest Home
Loan, Inc., 1993 WL 307747 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993); Erickson v. Painewebber, Inc., 1990 WL 104152
(N.D. Ill. July 13, 1990); Perry v. Beneficial National Bank, 1998 WL 279174 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 18,
1998); Patterson v. 1T Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
This issue is complicated in the securities arbitration context by a National Association of Securities
Dealers rule. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995); Nielsen v. Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation,
169 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Regal Communications Corp. Sees. Litig., 1995 WL 550454 (E.D.
Pa. Sept.14, 1995).
35. Blue Cross of California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Lewis
v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club,
231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See also Stemlight, supra note 33, at 110 ("Thus far, while
experiences with class action arbitration are scant, participants in the few classwide arbitrations that have
been held have not voiced sharp criticism of the inefficiency of such arbitrations."). See generally IAN
R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 18.9
(1994 & Supp. 1996).
36. See Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105-06 (W.D. Mich. 2000)
(finding an arbitration provision is unconscionable in part because it waives class remedies allowable
under Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), as well as certain declaratory and injunctive relief under federal
and state consumer protection laws); Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916,920-21 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (finding arbitration clause in contract of employment voided as unconscionable, in part,
because it would deprive arbitrator of authority to hear classwide claim), review granted and opinion
superseded, 995 P.2d 137 (Cal. 2000); Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 577 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999)
(refusing to enforce arbitration clause as unconscionable in part because of its retroactive application to
preexisting lawsuit and because one factor as to its substantive unconscionability was that it precluded
tlie possibility of classwide relief). "e.
The Supreme Court recently declined to address (because it was not properly raised in the lower
courts) a consumer's argument that her arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it precludes
pursuit of her Truth In Lending Act claim as a class action. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,
121 S. Ct. 513, 524 (2000).
[Vol. 200 1, No. I
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B. Capping Consumer Fees
While litigation is subsidized by the taxpayer, the parties must pay the full costs
of arbitration. It has long been customary in arbitration for the claimant to pay the
filing fee charged by the arbitration organization37 and for the parties to pay equal
shares of the arbitrator's fee. Recent employment arbitration cases, however, have
refused to enforce agreements requiring the employee-claimant to pay fees according
to this custom. 38  These cases effectively require the business to subsidize the
arbitration claim against it. Some employment cases go so far as to require the
business to pay all or nearly all of the costs of arbitration.39 Several lower courts
have moved toward this approach in the consumer arbitration context.
40
The Supreme Court addressed this topic in a recent Truth in Lending Act case,
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.4 ' The Court said that "the existence of
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant... from effectively vindicating her
federal statutory rights in the arbitralforum,"42 and this would presumably make the
37. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULE
R4(a)(ii) & ADMINISTRATIVE FEES (1999).
38. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Mr. Shankle signed the Agreement as a condition of continued employment.
The Agreement requires Mr. Shankle to arbitrate all disputes arising between he and his
former employer. In order to invoke the procedure mandated by his employer, however,
Mr. Shankle had to pay for one-half of the arbitrator's fees. Assuming Mr. Shankle's
arbitration would have lasted an average length of time, he would have had to pay an
arbitrator between $1,875 and $5,000 to resolve his claims. Mr. Shankle could not afford
such a fee, and it is unlikely other similarly situated employees could either. The
Agreement thus placed Mr. Shankle between the proverbial rock and a hard place-it
prohibited use of the judicial forum, where a litigant is not required to pay for a judge's
services, and the prohibitive cost substantially limited use of the arbitral forum. See Cole
v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (concluding employees would be unable to
pursue statutory claims if required to pay for arbitrator fees in addition to the
administrative costs and attorney fees, which accompany both arbitration and litigation).
Essentially, B-G Maintenance required Mr. Shankle to agree to mandatory arbitration as
a term of continued employment, yet failed to provide an accessible forum in which he
could resolve his statutory rights. Such a result clearly undermines the remedial and
deterrent functions of the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Id. at 1234-35. See also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir.
1998) ("Because Avnet makes no promises to pay for an arbitrator, employees may be liable for at least
half the hefty cost of an arbitration and must, according to the American Arbitration Association rules
the clause explicitly adopts, pay steep filing fees (in this case $2000)."); Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485
(interpreting agreement to hold that employer would pay fees and then enforcing agreement);
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745,765 (Cal. 2000) ("[W]hen
an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or
arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee
would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court."). But see Arakawa v.
Japan Network Group, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting Paladino and comparing
authorities from various courts).
39. See cases cited supra note 38.
40. See Dobbins v. Hawk's Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999); Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F.
Supp. 1426, 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1998); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821,838 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); Patterson,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567; Brower v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
41. Green Tree Fin., 121 S. Ct. 513.
42. Id. at 522.
2001]
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arbitration clause unenforceable. But the Randolph Court placed the burden of
showing prohibitively high fees on the consumer:
[W]here, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on
the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.
Randolph did not meet that burden. How detailed the showing of
prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must
come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for
in this case neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on
the merits was there any timely showing at all on the point. The Court of
Appeals therefore erred in deciding that the arbitration agreement's
silence with respect to costs and fees rendered it unenforceable. 3
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Randolph pointed out that "[a]s a repeat player in the
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior information about
the cost to consumers of pursuing arbitration.""' The dissent added: "In these
circumstances, it is hardly clear that Randolph should bear the burden of
demonstrating up front the arbitral forum's inaccessibility, or that she should be
required to submit to arbitration without knowing how much it will cost her. '45 The
dissent "would remand for clarification of Green Tree's practice" (if any) of
subsidizing the arbitration costs of its consumer-claimants. 4
Case law requiring a business to subsidize a consumer's arbitration claim would
raise prices in two respects. First, it would make arbitration more costly to
businesses by making businesses pay more in fees for each case. Second, it would
make arbitration more costly to businesses by increasing the number of cases
brought at all. It would do this by lowering the financial barrier to asserting a claim.
C. Requiring Substantial Discovery
"Limitations on discovery, particularly judicially initiated discovery, remain one
of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration."47 An important employment
arbitration case, however, indicates that arbitration agreements should not be
enforced unless they provide for "more than minimal discovery. '" 48 And there are a
43. Id. at 522-23. The Randolph Court seems to have overruled not only the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in that case, but other cases placing on the defendant the burden of proof regarding fees. See
Baron v. Best Buy Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370-71 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (refusing to grant a defendant's
motion to compel arbitration before the National Arbitration Forum because defendants "failed to
demonstrate in this record that the National Arbitration Forum is a neutral, inexpensive, and efficient
forum to determine these claims as required by law").
44. Green Tree Fin., 121 S. Ct. at 524-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 525.
46. Id.
47. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 35, § 34. 1.
48. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. See also Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (agreement to arbitrate
employment discrimination claims enforceable if"the arbitration [meets] certain minimum requirements,
including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that will
permit a limited form ofjudicial review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration").
[Vol. 2001, No. I
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few cases refusing to enforce employees' arbitration agreements because of, among
other things, the courts' concerns about insufficient discovery.49
It is not clear whether these precedents will be extended to consumer
arbitration 0 or whether they require as much discovery as litigation has. If they
require litigation-like discovery, they would raise the cost of arbitration to businesses
and therefore raise prices to consumers. Litigation-like discovery would both
increase the amount of time and money the business must spend on the discovery
process and make it easier for consumers to prove their claims."
D. Prohibiting Carve-Outs
Some arbitration agreements require arbitration of the consumer's claims but
permit the business to bring its claims in court. For example, some consumer credit
agreements require arbitration of all claims except for: (1) collection actions; and
(2) actions to preserve, repossess or foreclose on collateral. 2 These two "carve-
outs" encompass nearly all the claims lenders assert against consumer-borrowers.
A lender may find that these carve-outs save it money. 3 Collection actions
against consumers often result in default judgments,' so the challenge for the lender-
49. See Kinney v. United Health Care Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 354-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
("The unconscionable nature of the unilateral arbitral obligation is heightened by certain other terms of
United's arbitration policy. Given that United is presumably in possession of the vast majority of
evidence that would be relevant to employment-related claims against it, the limitations on discovery,
although equally applicable to both parties, work to curtail the employee's ability to substantiate any
claim against United."); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d
763, 766-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted and opinion superseded, 978 P.2d I (Cal. 1999),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 990 P.2d 504 (Cal. 1999); Hooters of America Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 582, 614-15 (D.S.C. 1998) (arbitration held unconscionable in part because procedural rules
were biased against employee and in favor of company where company had total control over selection
of arbitrators, employee had severely limited discovery, and witness disclosure and sequestration were
one-sided), affd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding employer had breached
arbitration agreement by issuing biased rules).
50. See Jean R. Stemlight, Drafting a "Bulletproof' Consumer Arbitration Agreement: Is It
Possible?, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES, 763,790 (1999) (courts "are
likely to strike down clauses which ... deny the consumer access to discovery which is necessary in
order for the consumer to have a chance of prevailing").
51. Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1053 ("More restrictive discovery may leave a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim unable to prove it."); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1,89-90 (1997) ("Where, for example, one party
has substantially greater access to relevant witnesses and physical and documentary evidence, denying
the other party any discovery will essentially deny them the opportunity to prevail in an arbitration.").
52. See, e.g., Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 905 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) ("Green
Tree retained the option to use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a security agreement relating to
the manufactured home, to enforce the monetary obligations secured by the manufactured home, or to
foreclose on the manufactured home.").
53. Cf Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil
Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 578 (2000).
54. Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U. C.C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1625-26 (1994) (the author is an attorney with the National Consumer Law
Center).
The prevalence of default judgments in collection actions likely explains why, in the case of a major
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plaintiff is not winning judgments but collecting them from often insolvent or
judgment-proof debtors. Also, collection actions against consumers nearly always
involve small amounts of money. The combination of these two facts makes
collections practice an assembly line in which large numbers of small claims are
processed at a low cost per claim.5 Even a slight increase in the cost per claim can
make a significantly higher percentage of debts effectively uncollectible. Arbitration
of collection actions may increase the cost per claim because the lender must win an
arbitration award and then get that award copfirmed in court,56 rather than simply
win a default judgment in court.5 7
The carve-out relating to collateral also geems well-suited to saving the lender
money. A court order is a preliminary step to repossession of collateral by a sheriff58
or to ajudicial foreclosure sale of collateral.5 9 Arbitration of lenders' claims relating
to collateral would be an additional step the lender would have to take before going
to court to get the necessary order.6°
credit card issuer, "not only has the company sought arbitration far more often than consumers, it has
also won in 99.6 percent of the cases that went all the way to an arbitrator." Caroline E. Mayer, Win
Some. Lose Rarely?: Arbitration Forum's Rulings Called One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,2000, at El.
See Matthew C. McDonald & Kirkland E. Reid, Arbitration Opponents Barking Up Wrong Branch, 62
ALA. LAW. 56, 60 (2001) ("[V]irtually all of these cases were collection cases filed by the bank against
customers more than six months behind on their credit cards bills. Unquestionably, the result in
collections court would have been the same.").
55. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Peterson, The Beauties of Mechanization, UTAH BAR J., Nov. 1998, at 11,
12 (describing collections practice as "mechanized" and "automated"); Duke Nordlinger Stem, Reducing
Your Malpractice Risk, A.B.A. J., June 1986, at 52 ("A collections practice, on the other hand, generally
involves a large volume of smaller matters. Effective and specialized management systems, which the
average law firm would not necessarily use, are needed to avoid improper practices and to honor
numerous deadlines.").
56. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). See Drahozal, supra note 3.
To enforce an arbitration award, a party will need to get it reduced to a courtjudgment, not
a complicated requirement but an additional step nonetheless, before it can recover on the
judgment. In simple disputes over money due it may be cheaper to skip that intermediate
step by having a court enter judgment for the amount owed. Similar arguments may
explain why foreclosure and eviction actions commonly are excluded from arbitration.
Id.
57. On the other hand, arbitration agreements may lower the cost of collections. The costs of
complying with the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 - 1692(o) (1994), and similar
state statutes may be higher when debts are collected through litigation than through arbitration. For
instance, these statutes may prohibit a nationwide creditor from threatening suit until it has taken the
costly step of engaging a lawyer with the present ability (local license) to sue. Cf id. § 1692(e)(5). In
contrast, these statutes may permit a nationwide creditor to threaten, and even bring, a collection action
in arbitration without a local lawyer, or even any lawyer at all. Cf JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN
L. CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 5.1.4a
(Supp. 2000) ("The creditor mails or even e-mails minimal paper work to initiate an arbitration collection
action, and need not even involve an attorney."). See also Brad 0. Nakamoto, Arbitration of Consumer
Financial Services Disputes, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 827 (1999).
58. U.C. C. § 9-503 (1999) ("judicial process").
59. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 66
(3d ed. 1996).
60. See Drahozal quote supra note 56.
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Some courts have refused to enforce arbitration agreements with one or both of
these carve-outs, in part because of the carve-outs. 6' These courts do not purport to
prohibit these carve-outs under all facts among all parties. But with respect to facts
like those before them, these courts effectively require lenders to arbitrate collection
actions and actions relating to collateral. By doing so, these cases make arbitration
more costly to lenders. Therefore, these cases raise the interest rates consumers pay.
III. CONCLUSION:,IS THE PRICE WORTH IT?
The previous section of this article discussed judicial decisions that raise prices
(and interest rates) by requiring arbitration to: (1) allow for class actions, (2)
subsidize the consumer's fees, (3) include substantial discovery, and (4) encompass
both parties' claims. Whether these price increases are worth incurring, i.e., whether
the judicial decisions are good policy, plainly depends on a number of factors
including the amount of the price increase caused by each category of judicial
decision. And different observers will certainly have different views about the value
of, for example, class actions and litigation-like discovery. This article makes no
attempt to assess the merits of those different views. Rather it argues that any such
assessment should consider the influence consumer arbitration law has on the prices
consumers pay.62 Failure to address price inevitably biases any assessment of
consumer arbitration law. It is easy to insist upon "due process" in consumer
arbitration, 63 indeed "due process" is as widely-cherished as "mom and apple pie,"
61. American General Fin., Inc. v. Branch, 2000 WL 1868516 (D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2000) (collection
actions and, not relied upon by court, actions relating to collateral); Showmethemoney Check Cashers,
Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Ark. 2000) (collection actions); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977
P.2d 989, 995-96 (Mont. 1999) (same); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 858-61
(W. Va. 1998) (collection actions and foreclosure). Cf. Fritz v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 1990 WL
186448, *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 1990) (uninsured motorist arbitration).
Cases enforcing arbitration clauses with carve-outs include: Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,
183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); We Care Hair Development, Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999);
In re Pate, 198 B.R. 841, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Meyers, 1993 WL 307747; Green Tree Agency.
Inc. v. White, 719 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. 1998); Sablosky v. EdwardS. Gordon Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 513,516
(N.Y. 1989).
62. Cf. Drahozal, supra note 53 at 587-88.
1 don't think 1 can really tell you whether consumer arbitration agreements should be
enforced or not. What I do think important to keep in mind is that courts that decide not
to enforce arbitration agreements, for whatever reason, perhaps justifiably, can impose
costs on the parties. Courts can't just hold something unconscionable without
consequences. Given that sophisticated parties find thesearbitration agreements beneficial,
it seems to me that there is evidence that they may be beneficial to unsophisticated parties
as well. You should at least keep in mind that there may be costs to not enforcing them.
The costs may be worth taking. It is not my place to tell you one way or the other, but there
are costs there that need to be taken into account.
Id.
63. Which is not to say that it is easy to get consensus about what constitutes due process. Many
major arbitration organizations have promulgated procedures designed to ensure due process in
consumer arbitration. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, A Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, available at http://www.adr.org/education/
education/consumer-protocol.html (1998); National Arbitration Forum, Due Process Standard, available
at http://www.arbforum.com/other/index.html (last visited April 30,2001); JAMS, Minimum Standards
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but the hard thinking begins when one asks who pays the price of process and how
much they pay.
of Procedural Fairness Policy on Financial Services Arbitrations, available at
http://www.jamsadr.comifinminimum-stds.asp (June 2000). All three of these can be found in print
in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES (Practicing Law Institute 1999).
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